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The interplay of cognition and cooperation 
 
Sarah F. Brosnan, Lucie Salwiczek, Redouan Bshary 
 
Abstract 
Cooperation often involves behaviours that reduce immediate payoffs for actors. Delayed 
benefits have often been argued to pose problems for the evolution of cooperation as 
learning such contingencies may be difficult as partners may cheat in return. Therefore, 
the ability to achieve stable cooperation has often been linked to a species’ cognitive 
abilities, which is in turn linked to the evolution of increasingly complex central nervous 
systems. However, in their famous 1981 paper, Axelrod & Hamilton stated that in 
principle even bacteria could play a tit for tat strategy in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma. 
While to our knowledge this has not been documented, interspecific mutualisms are 
present in bacteria, plants and fungi. Moreover, many species which have evolved large 
brains in complex social environments lack convincing evidence in favour of reciprocity. 
What conditions must be fulfilled so that organisms with little to no brainpower, 
including plants and single celled organisms, can, on average, gain benefits from 
interactions with partner species? On the other hand, what conditions favour the 
evolution of large brains, flexible behaviour which includes the use of misinformation, 
etc? These questions are critical, as they begin to address why cognitive complexity 
would emerge when ‘simple’ cooperation is clearly sufficient in some cases. This paper 
spans the literature from bacteria to humans in our search for the key variables that link 
cooperation and deception to cognition. 
 












Cooperation between unrelated individuals is of great interest for evolutionary 
biologists for several reasons. First, as cooperation involves investments (behaviour that 
reduces the immediate payoff of the actor) in the provision of benefits to another 
individual, one has to reconcile its existence with a theory of evolution that emphasizes 
the advantages of self-interest. How does a behaviour which benefits another individual 
evolve, and how do actors exchanging these benefits deal with the potential of cheating? 
Many analytical models and computer simulations describe the conditions under which 
cooperation may promote individual fitness. Often, however, proximate issues like the 
tendency to choose immediate benefits rather than delayed rewards have to be overcome 
to achieve stable cooperation. Second, cooperation may be at least partly responsible for 
the cognition with which it is associated. The ability to cooperate but also to manipulate 
and deceive partners is assumed to play an important role for an individual’s fitness in 
social species. Therefore, cognitive abilities that may enhance an individual’s 
competence may have been under strong positive selection and may have contributed to 
the evolution of (relatively) enlarged neocortices in birds, primates, cetaceans, and other 
highly cooperative vertebrates (Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis: Byrne & Whiten 
1988, Social Brain Hypothesis: Barton & Dunbar 1997, Emery, Clayton & Frith, 2007). 
Thus intelligence may not have evolved as a ‘universal capacity,’ but instead as a ‘social 
competence.’  
Nonetheless, it is important to note that social complexity involves a great variety 
of phenomena. For example, the Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis in its original 
form (Byrne & Whiten 1988, Whiten & Byrne 1997) took a wide, permissive perspective 
on the variety of socio-cognitive adaptations through which an individual may exploit the 
potential benefits of its social world, as well as dealing with the hostile aspects of it: 
social knowledge, discovery techniques, social curiosity, social problem solving, 
innovation, flexibility, social expertise, social play, mind-reading, self-awareness, 
imitation, and culture were all explicitly included. The importance of cooperation and 
deception relative to the other factors remains an open question. This becomes the more 
obvious as one realizes that cooperation per se does not require advanced cognition. 
Intraspecific cooperation and interspecific mutualisms are ubiquitous in nature, existing 
from single cell organisms to plants, invertebrates to humans. This ubiquity implies that 
cooperation and cheating can be achieved by very simple means. Thus while scenarios 
can be raised in which cooperation is cognitively demanding, it is also reasonable to 
assume that the advanced cognition which has been proposed is not required for all 
cooperation. As a consequence, cognitive complexity cannot be inferred from observing 
cooperation, but must be demonstrated experimentally. 
 In fact, pinnacles of social complexity appear to follow a bimodal distribution, 
where prominent species are either not very cognitive (single cellular organisms, social 
insects) or are among the most intelligent species on earth (humans; Clutton-Brock et al, 
2009; see also Connor, this volume). The selective forces differ, however. It is clear that 
helping behaviour in bacteria and eusocial insects is (almost) entirely driven by kin 
selection (Clutton-Brock et al., 2009), leading to behavioural strategies that are largely 
unconditional on the behaviour of partners (although they may be conditional on recipient 
identity and one’s body condition). While kin selection is important in large-brained 
social species as well, additional social complexity arises in these species from 
cooperation with unrelated individuals. Here, we are particularly interested in the 
possibility that specific cognitive abilities are linked to large-scale cooperation. 
Cognitive abilities may be important for two different aspects of cooperation. 
First, cognition may help make coordination between partners more efficient. Second, 
cognition may be important to make strategic decisions concerning the best behavioural 
option in a given situation. Following some important definitions (section 2), we will 
only briefly discuss the former aspect in section 3 and then focus on strategic decision 
making in section 4, which comprises the main body of this paper. In order to identify 
conditions that warrant the existence or evolution of (more advanced) cognitive abilities 
for social success, we will first analyse some examples of cooperative and deceptive 
behaviour in which decision making requires no brain at all. This will spotlight key 
conditions where simple decision rules are insufficient to prevent exploitation by 
cheaters, and thus will help to identify conditions under which cooperation is mediated by 
specific cognitive skills. In this context, we also discuss whether increasing cognitive 
abilities invariably help the evolution of cooperative behaviour, or whether they may in 
some circumstances hinder it.  
 
2. Some operational definitions 
2.1 Complex  
 Here, we mean complex to be a situation in which many factors go into the 
decision making process on two levels: (a) the number of different factors taken into 
account; and (b) extent of interactions of these factors. The relationships can be 
disproportional, e.g. at critical levels, a small change can make a big difference. In 
general it is possible to predict the outcome if factors going in to the situation are known, 
so recursive causality exists.  
 
2.2 Cognition, Emotion and Impulsivity 
We use ‘cognition’ as an umbrella term that starts with the acquisition of 
information from the environment and encompasses information processing, holding 
beliefs, desires, and knowledge, and some form of internal representation of this 
information. Cognitive mechanisms include elementary processes comprising perception, 
attention, action, memory, problem solving, concept formation, categorization, and 
generalization (Shettleworth 2009). Here, we focus on cognitive processes that 
specifically aim at dealing with the social environment. 
 Emotion is an umbrella term any internal state that make certain behaviours more 
likely, including such things as anger, fear, frustration, pleasure, joy, or euphoria. 
Emotions are valenced responses to internal and/or external stimuli mediated by different, 
though not necessarily exclusive, brain regions (e.g. LeDoux 2000, Bechara 2004, 
Bechara et al 2000, Berlin et al 2004). Previous psychological and neuro-scientific 
research reflected the long tradition of Western philosophy in viewing emotion and 
cognition as if they were separate processes. Today this view has been transformed into 
one which emphasises the bidirectional emotion-cognition interaction pathway (Maga & 
Cummings 1994) that may be necessary for adaptive functioning (e.g. Ochsner & Gross 
2005, Ochsner & Phelps 2007, Dolan et al. 2002). For example, emotional arousal has 
been associated with improved long-term memory causing an unusually high degree of 
detailed recall (Cahill et al 1995; Roozendaal et al 1995). Also, emotions exert a strong 
influence on reasoning and guides processes of decision making (Bechara 2004) in ways 
that are neither well understood nor systematically researched (Dolan 2002).  
   
2.3 Information and Memory  
  Information and memory are terms with many meanings depending on context 
and discipline. In this paper we use information loosely as environmental input to an 
organism, and consider memory to be the storage of such information. This storage can 
have various substrates, including B cells in the immune system or synapses and neural 
circuits. The latter comprises three storage systems, sensory memory, working memory, 
and reference memory (or long-term memory). Experimental studies into memory 
indicate that these systems interact over the course of learning (e.g. Kim & Baxter 2001; 
Thomson & Kim 1996; LeDoux 2000; Gaugh 2000). Thus, it may be less useful to talk 
about which memory system may support cognitive approaches to cooperation and more 
informative to discuss how memory in general may do so.  
 Memory may help in two ways. First, individuals may remember information 
about specific events and partners, such as what goods or services they gave to a partner, 
and which ones they are owed in return. Such 'book-keeping' closely resembles what has 
been called calculated reciprocity, in which individuals must remember which goods or 
services they have received and return an appropriately equivalent good or service at a 
later time (Brosnan & de Waal, 2002; de Waal & Brosnan, 2006). Memory may also 
encode less specific information. Considering reciprocity again, it may be sufficient for 
animals (including people) to remember whether the partner cooperated or defected on a 
previous move, or even to simply encode a positive or negative 'tag' (e.g. due to 
respective emotions) towards the partner. This sort of reciprocity, which has been called 
attitudinal reciprocity (de Waal, 2000; see also de Waal & Suchak, this volume), may be 
easier to encode due to a smaller memory load, yet sufficient to yield outcomes which are 
beneficial to the actor.  
 
3. Coordination and cognition 
 Some scientists define cooperation not by its fitness consequences but more 
operationally as ‘acting together’ (Noë 2006; Taborsky 2007). This definition 
emphasizes a general perception that cooperation should include an aspect of 
coordination between partners. The notion of coordinated action is particularly well 
supported if active recruitment can be documented. Recruitment is widespread in 
animals, ranging from insects to various vertebrates (insects: Hölldobler & Wilson 
2009; fish: Bshary et al. 2006; mammals: de Waal & van Hooff 1981, Gouzoules et al. 
1984; birds: Bugnyar & Kotrschal 2001). Much research on cooperation in biology 
focuses on task sharing and division of labour in cooperatively breeding species, 
another form of coordination. Eusocial species represent the pinnacle of this 
organisational complexity, yet the processes that achieve this complexity are not 
cognitive: in the hymenoptera, food quality received at the larval stage determines 
whether a female will become a worker or a queen. Furthermore, different casts with 
different functions are either based on anatomical specialization (in ants, termites) or on 
age related task specialisations (bees). Nevertheless, the efficiency of colonies is greatly 
enhanced by sophisticated communication that allows efficient exploitation of food 
sources, location of suitable new sites for nesting and communal defence against 
predators and competitors. 
It is important to note that in the most extreme case, coordination of individuals 
‘working together’ might be achieved without these individuals paying any attention at 
all to the others and the state of the other's work. For example social Stegodyphus spiders 
catch and handle prey too large for one single individual (Ward & Enders, 1985; Wickler 
& Seibt, 1993). A family of individuals approaches the prey independently in reaction to 
the net vibrations caused by the prey. Then together they pull the prey victim to their 
communal nest for consumption. This concerted cooperative effort results from sharing 
the same nest and consequently pulling in the same home-direction; it does not require 
any communication or monitoring of partners. 
In contrast to the spider example, cooperative hunting in vertebrates is the prime 
example where coordination has been linked to cognition. Boesch & Boesch (1989) 
proposed that collaborative hunting reflects the cognitive abilities of the species or 
population in question. They defined four levels of complexity of coordination during 
hunts: 1) similarity, in which all hunters concentrate similar actions on the same prey, but 
without any spatial or time relation between them, 2) Synchrony, in which each hunter 
concentrates similar actions on the same prey and tries to relate in time to each other’s 
action, 3) Coordination, in which each hunter concentrates on the same prey and tries to 
relate in time and space to the others’ actions, and 4) Collaboration, in which hunters 
perform different complementary actions directed to the same prey (e.g. encirclement). 
Collaboration has been observed in only a handful of species: chimpanzees, dolphins, 
orcas, lions and harris hawks (Boesch & Boesch 1989; Gazda et al. 2004; Connor, 2000; 
Baird, 2000; Stander 1992; Bednarz 1988). In contrast to task sharing in eusocial species 
the coordination in intraspecific collaborative hunting is rather complex: individuals must 
learn to perform variable behaviours and to keep track of others’ actions and outcomes 
for their efforts to be successful. An individual’s best behavioural option depends on 
what other group members are doing, which will vary from one hunt to the next, and even 
within the same hunt from moment to moment.  
Currently, evidence for intraspecific collaboration is restricted to mammals and 
birds. In fishes, the most complex form of intraspecific cooperative hunting described so 
far occurs in mormyrid fishes, in which individuals swim in formation while searching 
for prey (pack hunting; Arnegard & Carlson 2005). Full collaboration in fishes has been 
observed only in the interspecific context, where predator species with complementary 
hunting strategies team up and gain from the effect of their joint actions on the prey 
(Bshary et al., 2006; case observations in Lukoschek & McCormick 2002). With respect 
to cognition, however, such interspecific collaborative hunting seems to be more similar 
to collaboration in eusocial species, as each partner does what it has been selected to do.  
Finally, we note that coordination between group members concerning activity or 
movement patterns could be a very interesting topic to link cooperation and conflict with 
cognition, since coordination could become more difficult as group size increases. While 
much research focuses on functional aspects of decision making processes (Conradt & 
List, 2009), groups also function as information centres about ephemeral food patches. In 
this case the question arises what social skills are necessary to efficiently exploit the 
knowledge of others (Bugnyar & Heinrich 2005; Clayton et al, 2007; Dally et al, 2006; 
Emery et al, 2004; see also Earley, this volume). 
 
4. Strategic social behaviour and cognition 
We use the term ‘strategic’ if an individual may choose between different options 
from its behavioural repertoire where 1) the actual choice has consequences for the 
payoffs of both the actor and the partner(s) with whom it is currently interacting and 2) 
the optimal choice depends on the partner(s)’ strategy and corresponding behaviour. In 
other words, the individual can chose between different levels of cooperative behaviour, 
or between cooperative behaviour and cheating. Thus the appropriate choice of behaviour 
must be based on some sort of information, be it information about an individual’s 
internal state, specificities of the current situation, or about its own or its partner’s past 
behaviour.  
Not all cases of cooperation or mutualism are strategic in this sense. Instead, 
plenty of examples exist where each individual performs self-serving behaviour that 
benefits its partner(s) as a by-product (termed ‘by-product mutualism’, Brown 1983). 
Cooperative hunting is a prime example because the benefits of cooperation can only be 
achieved if individuals act together. Hence the best response of an individual to its 
partner hunting is to join the hunt. In golden jackals, for example, Lamprecht (1978) 
observed a six fold increase in hunting success in pairs compared to singleton hunts, 
making cheating an unprofitable action. As a consequence, by-product mutualisms do not 
require strategic behaviour. We do not consider these cases further. 
 
4.1. Strategic behaviour without a brain   
 Cooperation and deception based on strategic behaviour can sometimes occur 
even though partners lack a brain. A well studied system is the interspecific mutualism 
between leguminose plants and rhizobia (Kiers et al. 2003). In fact, this system does not 
require learning, memory, or individual recognition. The plant makes the initial 
investment, providing shelter (nodules) and carbohydrates to the bacteria, which then fix 
nitrogen for the plant (the second investment). However, the bacteria differ in their ability 
to fix nitrogen and, since fixing nitrogen requires energy, lines that fix less nitrogen save 
energy due to their (genetically determined) cheating. Thus, the plant invests in a 
structure where benefits are delayed, or even not reciprocated if rhizobia enter the nodule 
and then fix little or no nitrogen. However, a plant interacts simultaneously with many 
bacteria of different lines spread over the nodules in its entire root system, which gives it 
some recourse. 
Experiments demonstrate that plants can assess the quantity of nitrogen fixation in 
different parts of the root system and respond appropriately: in areas with a lot of 
nitrogen fixation the plant grows new roots, whereas plants reduce root growth in areas 
with low nitrogen fixation (Kiers et al. 2003). The results demonstrate a plant’s ability to 
detect cheaters and to sanction them. Plants are able to solve the various problems 
because a) the initial investment in the construction of nodules is based on a genetic 
program, so the initial investment in the interaction is guaranteed, b) the assessment of 
partner quality is based on the evaluation of current physiological activity (nitrogen 
fixation) in each nodule, c) partner ‘recognition’ is possible based on location, and d) the 
response to both cooperators and cheaters is immediately self-serving: the plant grows 
roots where its gains are high, which benefits cooperators and sanctions cheaters.  
It is interesting to turn the point around and to ask what the plant does not need to 
do to gain benefits. First, the plant is not hindered by the initial cost of growing a nodule, 
nor does it need to assess initially whether the current investment of growing nodules will 
be fully compensated, since growing a nodule is genetically determined and, hence, an 
unconditional action. However, if the decision to grow nodules was based on learning 
and memory, it would be cognitively demanding to associate current costs with delayed 
benefits. Second, the plant does not need any long-term memory for its decision 
regarding where to grow new nodules, but can respond to the current situation. A change 
in the local composition of Rhizobia strains automatically leads to a change in local 
nitrogen fixation, which automatically leads to a change in local nodule growth rate by 
the plant. Third, the plant does not have to recognize bacteria partners as individuals 
because the bacteria’s movements are restrained. The system seems to work, even though 
it is not perfectly discriminative: the plant’s decision based on location means that 
cooperative strains will also be sanctioned if they share a nodule with cheating strains. 
Finally, the controlling action of the plant that reduces the fitness of cheating strains – 
growing nodules as function of local nitrogen fixation – does not decrease immediate 
payoffs. Thus, the success of the controlling action does not depend on cheaters behaving 
more cooperatively in the future, and so does not require any ability to plan for the future 
or mechanisms to get around the problem of temporal discounting.  
The lack of these features is interesting because learning and memory, individual 
recognition, and planning for the future are assumed to require increasingly complex 
nervous systems. As we illustrated with the plant-rhizobia example above, plants and 
bacteria do not need these abilities for their mutualistic interactions. Nevertheless, simple 
forms of memory exist in bacteria (e.g. Casadesus et al, 2002) and plants (e.g. Thellier et 
al, 2000; Volkov et al, 2008). Although these kinds of non-neuronal memories seem to be 
rather constrained in extent and variety, it may still turn out that they are used for 
strategic decision making in the context of cooperation. 
 
4.2. Strategic behaviour demanding higher cognitive abilities 
 In this part we will explore factors which are likely to make strategic behaviour 
more complex, and hence demand at least some cognition.  
4.2.1 Partner mobility 
 The majority of animals are mobile. Strategic behaviour becomes more complex 
when partners are mobile for two reasons. First, mobility means that there may be both 
spatial and temporal separation between interactions. Therefore, any appropriate decision 
making that includes information about past interactions has to be based on memory. 
Second, mobility often causes encounters with several potential partners, requiring 
individual recognition and memory to choose appropriate partners and determine the 
appropriate behaviour (e.g. a biological market; Noë et al. 1991). Note that individual 
recognition is not automatically linked to mobility. In many cases of mutualism, only one 
partner is mobile and may remember the location of sessile partners rather than recognize 
partners as individuals. For instance, insect pollinators (who are mobile) could avoid 
deceptive plants that do not produce nectar based on spatial memory (avoidance of 
location where the non-mobile plant is), and further generalization of negative 
experiences may allow experienced pollinators to avoid cheater species entirely (Gigord 
et al. 2002).  
One can imagine scenarios where even if both partners are mobile they could 
potentially use location rather than individual recognition for decision making. However, 
most situations would favour individual recognition of mobile partners. Indeed, this 
ability is widespread among vertebrates, and there is increasing evidence that some 
invertebrate species have this ability as well. Individual recognition has been 
demonstrated in paper wasps (Tibbets, 2002), the burying beetle Nicrophorus vespilloides 
(Steiger et al, 2008), and the lobster Homarus americanus (Karavanich et al, 1998). Thus, 
while individual recognition of mobile partners seems to be a prerequisite for cognitively 
complex cooperation, it is not the case that only highly encephalised organisms are 
capable of partner recognition.  
4.2.2 Delays and the problems of cooperation 
 While some decisions can be made on information which is currently available, in 
other cases individuals must make decisions based on information from the past or 
expectations of the future, in particular if individuals are mobile (see section 4.2.1). 
Current information is easier to deal with not only because it does not require memory, 
but also because a lack of cooperation from the partner will immediately affect the 
internal state of an individual, affecting behaviour (e.g. a lack of fixed nitrogen could 
cause a lack of root growth in the vicinity). In contrast, if there are discrete interactions 
with a period of time between intervals (starting from a fraction of a second, see Frey & 
Morris, 1997; Dudai, 2009), it becomes increasingly unlikely that a partner’s cheating 
during the last interaction will affect an actor’s current state. Therefore, the individual has 
to base its behavioural decision on some sort of memory, either an explicit calculated 
memory of the interaction or an emotional reaction that is generated by the interaction 
(Brosnan & de Waal, 2002).  
 Moreover, individuals must overcome the issue of delay of gratification, and be 
capable of ‘paying’ now for a future benefit. This is a problem plants do not have when 
growing nodules or producing nectar because genetic programs cause such investments. 
However, in organisms with cognition, if there is a time delay between investment and 
compensation, there is the risk that they will discount goods and services, potentially at 
different rates depending on an individual’s role (e.g. the one owed versus the one 
owing). In fact, we know that animals (and humans) strongly discount the future, often 
preferring smaller immediate rewards to larger, temporally distant rewards (e.g. Stevens 
& Hauser, 2004). Humans can plan for the future, but there is more debate about other 
species (see section 4.3.3 below for more discussion; see also Melis & Semmann, this 
volume, for a discussion of how human cooperation differs from that of other species). 
 4.2.2.1 Conditioning and temporal delays  
Bacteria and plants may use innate decision rules for their behaviour/physiology, but the 
evolution of information storage and calculation in the brain allows individuals to change 
behaviour based on learning. The basic forms of associative learning, Pavlovian and 
operant conditioning, have been demonstrated across a wide range of animal taxa 
(Wynne 2001). In Pavlovian (classical) conditioning, an animal learns to associate stimuli 
with each other while in operant (instrumental) conditioning, an animal learns to 
associate their own behaviour with outcomes in the environment. If the outcomes are 
favourable, this positive reinforcement will increase the probability that the animal will 
perform the behaviour again in the future. In contrast, if the changes are negative, the 
probability of showing the behaviour again will decrease. Associative learning 
mechanisms appear to be the most widely used learning mechanisms in animals 
(Mackintosh 1974, 1983; Wynne 2001), and researchers in animal cognition have found 
it challenging to properly demonstrate more complex cognitive abilities in animals. While 
there is evidence for other mechanisms, including insight learning, planning, perspective 
taking, experience projection, and mental time travelling, the evidence is restricted to few 
species and does not preclude associative learning in addition to these more complex 
mechanisms. Therefore, it is important to evaluate how associative learning may affect an 
animal’s ability to cooperate or to deceive.  
 Empirical studies on associative learning have revealed the overwhelming 
importance of temporal contingency for efficient associative learning. With the known 
exception of food poisoning (e.g. conditioned taste aversion), stimulus and response must 
be closely linked in time, between less than a second in some species up to minutes in 
others. Due to this intimate link in time, any behaviour has to provide benefits quickly; 
without a positive or negative reinforcer learning will not occur or extinction will 
(finally) eliminate the appearance of the behaviour. The inherent constraints of 
associative learning mechanisms may explain why animals often do not achieve stable 
cooperation even though the conditions/payoffs favour cooperative solutions in the long 
term. 
 Deception, too, may be affected by associative learning. Deceptive alarm calls by 
several species of birds and primates (e.g. Wheeler, 2009; Møller, 1988) may be due to a 
conditioned association by the ‘deceptive’ caller. At some point, that individual may have 
given a spontaneous alarm call in a non-predator context, perhaps due to the stress 
inherent in the situation (e.g. an attack by a dominant).  If this call resulted in the 
cessation of the stressful situation (e.g. the dominant left), it would have created a strong 
association in the mind of the caller, and led to future false alarm calls. This is functional 
deception, but does not require any explicit understanding of how the call affected others’ 
behaviour on the part of the caller. Moreover, conditioning may lead the other individuals 
in the group to learn whose alarm calls are legitimate and whose are not. If one 
individual’s alarm calls routinely occur outside of the context of actual danger (i.e. lack 
of reinforcer in form of a predator), others may cease attending to their calls. Thus, 
conditioning may paradoxically lead both to deception and be a mechanism for avoiding 
being deceived. However, neither will occur if the time period between the stimuli and 
responses are too long. 
 Delays between actions and consequences may represent situations in which the 
evolution of a large brain is important; species with larger brains may be better equipped 
to deal with longer delays in the conditioning process and/or the ability to refrain from 
impulsivity. Although some species can postpone behaviours that yield small immediate 
benefits for only a very short time (on the order of seconds) in favour of delayed larger 
benefits, some apes can postpone for much longer (Beran & Evans, 2006; Dufour et al, 
2007). In cooperative situations, delays can be even run 30-60 minutes, as in cleaning 
interactions (Bshary & Grutter 2002, Bshary & Schäffer 2002), to a day or more, as in 
blood provisioning in vampire bats (Wilkinson, 1984). However, even this may not be 
long enough for all situations, essentially putting a hard cap on the ability of learning to 
influence cooperative behaviour.  
 
4.3 Strategic behaviours and temporal delays 
4.3.1 Cooperation and the problem of investments   
 Of the many concepts that can explain stable cooperative behaviour, only two 
assume that cooperative behaviour is better than cheating by default (Bshary & Bronstein 
2004 see Table 1). In by-product mutualism (Brown 1983), benefits to partner(s) are the 
result of immediately self-serving decisions. For example, individuals may self-servingly 
decide to remain in the vicinity of others in order to reduce predation risk, which as a by-
product benefits all group members in addition to the actor (selfish herd; Hamilton 1971). 
Delayed benefits may still be predictable, as in positive pseudoreciprocity (Connor 1986). 
According to this concept, stable cooperation may be achieved if an investment by one 
partner enables the recipient to perform a self-serving behaviour that nonetheless benefits 
the investor as a by-product. For example, some fungus-harvesting ants provide services 
to the fungi, which allow the fungi to (self-servingly) grow and reproduce, which in turn 
benefits the ants because they harvest fungi for food (Mueller et al. 2005).  
 In all other concepts of cooperation, there is a temptation to avoid investment in 
the cooperative behaviour, which constitutes cheating. For example, flowering plants 
would do best if pollinators provide their service without being rewarded (Brandenburg et 
al. 2009). Therefore, individuals must be able to detect any cheating from the partner and 
to respond in a way that increases the cost of cheating to the actor so that it does not yield 
net benefits. We refer to these responses as partner control mechanisms. Effective partner 
control mechanisms are responses to cheating that reduce the cheater’s payoff to a level 
that puts cheating under negative selection, and so lead to stable cooperation either over 
an individual’s lifetime or over evolutionary time.  
 There are three basic situations in which control mechanisms encourage 
investments (Bshary & Bergmüller 2008). First, investment pays if by so doing the 
investor avoids a self-serving response that would reduce the payoffs of a cheater as a by-
product (‘negative pseudoreciprocity’). For example, if a pollinator lays too many larvae 
in a yucca fruit, the plants abort these fruits. Although this is because these larvae would 
eat all the seeds, it serves to encourage cooperation by the pollinator (Pellmyr & Huth 
1994). Similarly reef fish will visit another cleaner for their next inspection if their 
current cleaner wrasse cheats (Bshary & Schäffer 2002). Second, investment pays if it 
leads to return investments (‘positive reciprocity’). Tit-for-tat like reciprocity is based on 
such mutual rewards (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981). Third, investment pays if by so doing 
the investor avoids a costly response aimed at reducing a cheater’s payoff (‘negative 
reciprocity’). Punishment (Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995) and policing (Ratnieks 1988) 
are control mechanisms based on negative reciprocity (see Gächter et al, this volume and 
Jensen, this volume for further discussions of punishment and spite).  
 Appropriate strategies can in principle be encoded genetically and performed in 
response to key stimuli, as argued by Axelrod & Hamilton (1981). However, any species 
with a nervous system may learn about the behaviour of others, as well as about the 
consequences of their own behaviour, and adapt accordingly (Wynne 2001). Cooperative 
solutions may be made more likely by mechanisms for overcoming immediate costs, such 
as empathy or an innate tendency towards helping (see de Waal & Suchak this volume, 
Jaeggi et al. this volume). Alternatively, individuals may explore a variety of behaviours, 
some of which will be cooperative (McNamara & Leimar, this volume). With time, their 
behavioural decisions will be based on learning what rules yield high payoffs. In this 
scenario, cooperative behaviour is likely to emerge if the partner uses negative 
pseudoreciprocity or positive or negative reciprocity as control mechanisms. However, 
the corresponding controlling behaviours differ with respect to the ease with which they 
are learned. In negative pseudoreciprocity, the best option for the controlling individual is 
to cooperate as long as the partner cooperates (plants directing resources to the fruit so 
that it develops, clients returning to a cooperative cleaner wrasse), while stopping the 
interaction with a cheater is immediately self-serving. Therefore, individuals that explore 
a variety of behaviours could easily learn with associative learning to both cooperate and 
control the partner’s behaviour. Under these conditions, stable cooperation appears to be 
achieved relatively easily.  
 In positive reciprocity, the best behaviour for the controlling individual is to stop 
investing if the partner cheats, which is immediately self-serving (defecting in an Iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma). Thus, the control mechanism can easily be learned with associative 
learning. However, because cheating yields larger short-term payoffs than cooperating, 
the system is prone to end up in mutual defection. Finally, in negative reciprocity, the 
controlling behaviour is to punish a cheater. By definition (Clutton-Brock & Parker 
1995), punishment reduces immediate payoffs of both punisher and victim. Thus, while 
punishment may be useful in promoting future cooperative behaviour in cheaters, it 
suffers from similar problems as investments: if the behaviour is not part of a genetic 
strategy, operant conditioning will disfavour punishment because of its immediate costs 
to the actor. An additional problem for negative reciprocity is that the incentives are 
negative reinforcers, so cooperation can only be learned after punishment for failure to 
cooperate. Thus, negative reciprocity seems to be particularly cognitively demanding 
compared to other concepts of cooperation. Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated in 
marine cleaning mutualism (Bshary & Grutter 2005, Raihani et al. 2010), suggesting that 
at least vertebrates show this control mechanism. 
 
Table 1 
Concept Term from the literature Controlling behaviour 
Direct positive 
pseudoreciprocity 
Pseudoreciprocity  Not necessary, investments enable 
by-product returns by the partner 
Direct negative 
pseudoreciprocity 
Sanctions, partner switching, 
power 
If an individual cheats, the 
partner’s self-serving response is 
to stop interacting (and possibly 
find someone else) 
Indirect positive 
pseudoreciprocity 
Social prestige If an individual cheats, a 
bystander’s self-serving response 




Pay-to-stay If an individual cheats, a 
bystander’s self-serving response 




Tit-for-tat like reciprocity If an individual cheats, the partner 
cheats in return 
Direct negative 
reciprocity 
Punishment  If an individual cheats, the partner 
pays to inflict costs on the cheater 
indirect positive 
reciprocity 
Indirect reciprocity based on 
image scoring, generalized 
reciprocity 
If an individual cheats, a 
bystander cheats it in return 
Indirect negative 
reciprocity 
Policing, third party 
punishment  
If an individual cheats a bystander 
pays to inflict costs on the cheater 
 
4.3.2 Subjective rewards and emotions  
Temporal discounting seems to work strongly against long-term investments, thus 
a more convenient solution could be the evolution of mechanisms that make an animal 
subjectively perceive an investment as a benefit, hereafter called subjective reward. 
Subjective rewards should be linked to investments where the likelihood of future 
benefits is high. The ‘objective’ cost of the investment would be perceived as ‘subjective’ 
benefit. An excellent example is humans who punish transgressors not to change their 
behaviour (they can’t in these experiments), but because it makes them feel good (de 
Quervain et al. 2004, e.g. Singer et al, 2006). 
 If the point of subjective payoffs is to achieve prosocial outcomes, as has been 
argued recently, then this may be present in other species as well (de Waal et al. 2008, 
Jaeggi et al. this volume, de Waal & Suchak this volume). Such subjective payoffs may 
also help individuals avoid situations in which cooperation leads to outcomes which, 
while positive, are insufficient relative to a partner (Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; Brosnan, 
Freeman & de Waal, 2006; Brosnan 2008). Many subjective rewards are based on 
friendship, a voluntary, long-term affiliative social relationship between two or more 
individuals (Wasilewski, 2003). Such long term relationships may provide a solution to 
the problems deriving from temporal discounting by providing a ‘safe’ environment 
(Wickler 1976) in which to cooperate, based not on the memory of each past interaction 
but the memory of the relationship quality. An open question is whether one needs a large 
brain to build subjective payoffs, or whether these may also occur in less encephalised 
species. For example, hormones may be directly responsible for or affect cognitive 
processes that lead to investments (Soares et al. this volume). 
 
 4.3.3 Planning for the future 
 Mental time travelling, the ability to mentally re-live personal past experiences 
and to pre-live future events (Suddendorf & Corballis 1997, Boyer 2008), may provide 
another means to overcome temporal discounting. This is because individuals can 
voluntarily construct possible future events in their mind, and even incorporate emotions 
associated with the outcome of the imagined future scenarios (Ainsle 2007). In this way 
individuals may ‘experience’ (’pre-live’) future outcomes of current options in the 
present, and compare them to short-term rewards side by side. Once a species evolved the 
cognitive components necessary to have voluntary access to remembered facts (semantic 
memory) and then even to re-experience episodes from one's own past (episodic memory, 
Tulving 1972, 1983), it might have the prerequisite for investments based on combining 
recent events with information stored in long-term memory to predict future 
consequences (Suddendorf & Corballis 1997). Some argue that animals are caught in the 
present, unable to consider activities beyond those for which cues (internal or external) 
are immediately present (Suddendorf & Busby 2003, Roberts, 2002). If this was the case 
in the strict sense, then animals could not mentally value future benefits since future 
would not exist for them. However, comparative psychologists make a good case for 
future planning in species like food-caching Western scrub jays (e.g. Raby & Clayton, 
2007) and apes (Call, 2007; Osvath & Osvath, 2008).  
 Nevertheless, mental time travelling does not always resolve the problem of 
discounting the future. The time window to look in to the future, also called the 'future 
time perspective' (Fellows & Farah, 2005), contributes to determining what priorities will 
be set and what anticipated outcomes and reinforcers (both negative/positive) will be 
considered. This temporal framework might vary between species (Fellows & Farah, 
2005) and hence is likely to affect their ability to cooperate. One way to increase 
acceptable time delays is to manipulate emotions/physiological states. Various forms of 
stress, such as anxiety, and boredom have been related to time perception (Hancock & 
Weaver 2005). For instance, primates can counteract impulsivity through self-distraction, 
which may function both to occupy the individual and to lengthen acceptable delays in 
gratification (Heilbronner & Platt, 2008; Evans & Beran, 2007).  
  
5. Cooperation in networks/groups 
5.1 The use of public information 
 One additional factor, mentioned previously, which may make cooperation more 
complex is the use of ‘public’ information from observation rather than ‘private’ 
information from personal experience (for a detailed discussion surrounding this topic, 
see Earley, this volume). Public information from eavesdropping has been found in many 
different species, mostly vertebrates (McGregor, 2005). The concepts of indirect 
reciprocity based on image scoring (Alexander, 1987; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998) and 
indirect pseudoreciprocity based on image scoring (‘social prestige’, Zahavi 1995, 
Roberts 1998) deal with public information in the context of cooperation. The former 
concept has been demonstrated only in humans so far (Wedekind & Milinski 2000), 
while the latter can be found in cleaning mutualism (Bshary & Grutter 2006).  
 Using public information for behavioural decisions requires certain cognitive 
abilities. First, senses have to be developed in order to gain the information. Bystanders 
have to recognise individuals and acquire information about what they are doing. 
Furthermore, bystanders have to evaluate the behaviour of others in an indirect way: the 
observed behaviour does not influence the payoffs of bystanders. Thus, bystanders have 
to deduce from the effects of someone’s behaviour on third parties how this someone 
would affect their own payoffs, which may be either difficult or misleading (Brosnan et 
al. 2003). Based on this evaluation, bystanders then have to decide whether they should 
seek or avoid interactions with this individual, and, if an interaction takes place, whether 
or not to cooperate. This has the potential to make decision rules for cooperation 
considerably more complex, in part because the use of public information selects for 
behavioural changes among the observed individuals (e.g. audience effects). For 
example, cleaner wrasses behave more cooperatively if they are observed (Bshary & 
Grutter 2006), which devalues the quality of public information. Models show that the 
possibility of collecting public information may cause not only an increase in 
cooperation, but potentially also in aggression (Johnstone & Bshary 2004) and even 
allow the evolution of tactical deception (Johnstone & Bshary 2007). 
 There are advantages if individuals are able to understand and utilize public 
information. In the case of conditional cooperation, using public information may allow 
better predictions because the information may be more recent than personal experience. 
Public information may be particularly relevant for an individual’s ability to choose ideal 
cooperation partners from among potential candidates. Observation of others’ interactions 
will yield information about newly forming alliances or newly arising conflicts that can 
be counteracted or reinforced with strategic behaviour. This may lead to the possibility of 
changing partners. At the same time, observed individuals should hide their intentions if 
detrimental. 
5.2 N-player games 
 In our evaluation on the factors that cause an increase in cognitive requirements 
for appropriate strategic decision making we have until now focused on concepts for two 
player interactions. It is clear that coordination increases in complexity as the number of 
simultaneous partners increases. With respect to strategic decision making, it is difficult 
to predict how the addition of partners relates to complexity. On the most basic level, n-
player cooperation either constitutes a by-product mutualism (West et al. 2007) in which 
every individual should contribute, or an n-player prisoner’s dilemma (‘the tragedy of the 
commons’, Hardin 1968) where nobody should contribute. However, Milinski and 
colleagues have pointed out that group living species will face both group and pair 
situations, and that behaviour in one condition may have implications on behaviour in the 
other. In humans, individuals that contribute to a public good raise their image score and 
therefore receive more help in pairwise interactions (Milinski et al. 2002). The main 
cognitive challenge in such cases will be that as the number of interactors increases, so 
does the burden on memory. Individuals have to simultaneously monitor the behaviour of 
all partners in group situations to respond appropriately in pairwise situations. One way 
around the problem of monitoring directly may be the use of gossip (Sommerfeld et al. 
2008), but this requires language. We do not discuss the issue of n-player interactions in 
more detail, but refer the reader to Connor (this volume). 
 
6. Conclusions 
 Cooperation is widespread in nature, which precludes the possibility that it always 
requires advanced cognitive abilities. Stable investments may be achieved with minimal 
cognition in bacteria and plants. A lack of mobility combined with simple evaluation of 
current levels of cooperation by the partner and controlling behavioural responses to 
cheating that are immediately self-serving allow stable investments with minimal 
information processing. Moreover, these investments may be based on genetic programs, 
further reducing complications.  
 Mobility and discrete interactions make cooperation more complex, and learning 
and memory become prerequisites for decision rules that allow individuals to invest 
without being exploited by cheaters. Simple learning mechanisms like associative 
learning most likely hinder the establishment of stable cooperation since animals would 
learn to avoid investments because they fail to associate the investment with delayed 
benefits. Additional cognitive abilities are required to allow individuals to develop 
investment behaviours. Subjective rewards, empathy, friendship, future planning or other 
mechanisms may all allow cooperation where associative learning would not. More 
generally, the idea that associative learning leads to the maximisation of immediate 
payoffs may explain the perception that complex societies can best be achieved either 
without a brain due to kin selection, or with a very large brain due to mutual investments. 
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